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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE--DEFICIENCY

JUDGMENTS. In

the case

of Suring State Bank v. Giese and others, ---- Wis.--------- NW___,
the Suring State Bank held a real estate mortgage of $2,000 against
Giese and others. The plaintiff bank began foreclosure by action and
included a prayer for a deficiency judgment. At the sale the plaintiff
bid in the land at $600 and the sheriff's report contained the report of
a deficiency of $1,379.16. On plaintiff's motion to confirm the sale and
for deficiency judgment the trial court found that the land was reasonably worth $2,000. It confirmed the sale but refused to grant a deficiency judgment. Plaintiff appealed from the order. The Supreme
Court reversed the order on the ground that the lower court had erred
in categorically denying the prayer for deficiency judgment without
giving the plaintiff an option to accept or reject the condition.
The newspapers daily contain articles of real estate mortgage foreclosures in Wisconsin at a price far below the amount of the mortgage.
A necessary consequence is the sinister shadow of the deficiency judgment. These newspapers also contain accounts of open revolt against
the practice of foreclosing in these economically abnormal times. To
the honor and credit of Wisconsin it can be said that our Supreme
Court has recognized that the continuance of such practices must
necessarily result in future problems of greater consequence. Economic
and political revolution is no longer an empty warning. Let us hope
that we can expect such affirmative action on the part of the other coordinate departments of our state government.
The court lays down in this decision the procedure that the trial
courts may adopt during the continuance of this economic emergency.
There are three courses open to the lower courts:
First: The trial court may refuse to confirm the sale where the bid
is substantially inadequate. The court expressly recognizes the estab-

lished equity rule that mere inadequacy of consideration is not a ground
for granting a resale. See Meehan v. Blodgett, 86 Wis., 57 N.W. 291.
But this rule was held to apply only where no other equitable facts appeared such as "mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence on the part
of interested partis or intending bidders" with the result that a fair and
adequate price was not obtained. Griswold v. Barden, 146 Wis. 35, 130
N.W. 952; Kramer v. Thwaits, 105 Wis. 534, 81 N.W. 654; Johnson v.
Goult, 106 Wis. 247, 82 N.W. 239. The court holds that this emergency
has caused "the almost complete absence of a market for real estate.
As a consequence there is no cash bidding at sales upon foreclosure."
Would it not be almost hypocrisy to argue that equity should hold
otherwise ?
Second: The trial court may before ordering the sale or resale determine, after a proper hearing, the reasonable value of the property
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as a minimum price at which the property must be bid in at the sale.
If the sale price is less than that amount the court may refuse to confirm the sale. This practice has heretofore been followed in the forced
sales of large corporate assets where it is impossible to arrive at a fair
price by competitive bidding. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 Sup.Ct. 544. The theory is that there can be
from the nature of the case no competitive bidding. The court in this
case takes judicial notice that this economic emergency has rendered
any semblance of competitive bidding at even a sale of a $2,000 mortgage solely a matter of abstract legal theory. This economic upheaval
has exterminated that species of humanity commonly known as an auction bidder desiring to purchase, with money to back up his desires.
Third: The court may upon application for confirmation, if it has
not theretofore established an upset price, determine such price before
confirmation and then require such upset or fair price be credited upon
the mortgage judgment. If such fair price discharges the judgment
there is no need for a deficiency judgment. When this course is adopted
the plaintiff should be given the option to accept or reject the arrnagement. If he rejects it a new sale should be ordered.
And so the relief that the oppressed farm and home owners of Wisconsin have hoped and prayed for has come to pass. Once again the
people of Wisconsin can rest secure in the assurance that their supreme
court is ever awake to the needs of the people of this state in their unceasing efforts to create on the shores of the Great Lakes a haven of
political and economic freedom and equality.
C.

J. SCELOEMER.

INHERITANCE TAX-GIFTS-DEED ABSOLUTE-In the case of In re
Ogden's Estate, - Wis.
, 244 N.W. 571, a gift of real estate
was made by a deed absolute from the father to his daughter. He died
some 3 years 7 months later. There was an oral understanding that
the father should enjoy all right to the income of the property. The
trial court held that the gift of the real property in question was subject to a state inheritance tax because intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after donor's death. An appeal resulted in
an affirmation of the judgment, the Supreme Court holding--"The gift
was not completed, and the use and enjoyment never passed to the
donee until the donor died, and so long as this privilege could not be
exercised by the donee, it is subject to the tax."
The Wisconsin court in so ruling follows innumerable cases decided
likewise in the United States. In our analysis we must remember that
there is a distinction between gifts made in contemplation of death and

